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Information superiority, network centric warfare and the knowledge edge

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Abstract

The notes notes that a socio-cultural phenomenon has occurred in the Defence community whereby it has become commonplace for the assumption to be made that success in various types of modern warfare will be assured if Information Superiority can be achieved. It presents oultine arguments that suggest that this assumption is fallacious. It concludes that: success in network centric warfare requires knowledge superiority and benefits from information superiority; success in manoeuvre warfare requires knowledge superiority and benefits form information superiority; a decision edge requires a knowledge edge and benefits form an information edge.

Executive Summary

The report notes that a socio-cultural phenomenon has occurred in the Defence community whereby it is has become commonplace for the assumption to be made that success in various types of modern warfare will be assured if Information Superiority can be achieved. In an attempt to redress this phenomenon, it presents outline arguments that suggest that this assumption is fallacious. The arguments are constructed using ideas drawn from prominent Defence publications. Definitions and explanations of fundamental concepts are provided as appropriate. It begins with a brief description of the context in which the socio-cultural phenomenon has occurred. The description is framed in terms of key extracts from US Joint Vision 2010 (JV2010), [DOD 1997], and Australia's Strategic Policy (ASP97), [Defence 1997]. It then addresses the significance of Information Superiority and Knowledge Superiority in Network Centric Warfare. By referring to the recently published Network Centric Warfare, [Alberts, Garstka et al. 1999] and drawing an analogy with a "quasiase-study", it constructs an argument that concludes that: Success in Network Centric Warfare requires Knowledge Superiority and benefits from Information Superiority. It continues by considering the salient relationships between Decision Superiority and Manoeuvre Warfare; Knowledge Superiority and Knowledge Warfare. An analysis based on ‘Decisive Manoeuvre: Australian Warfighting Concepts to Guide Campaign Planning’, [Defence 1998] leads to the following conclusion: Success in Manoeuvre Warfare requires Knowledge Superiority. It then addresses the significance of Information Superiority and Knowledge Superiority in Manoeuvre Warfare. Further extracts from Decisive Manoeuvre are combined with intermediate conclusions made in previous reasoning to conclude that: Success in Manoeuvre Warfare requires Knowledge Superiority and benefits from Information Superiority. It continues by considering the nature of the Knowledge Edge and its relationships with the Decision Edge and the Information Edge. By making some plausible assumptions, the reasoning is extended to conclude that: A Decision Edge requires a Knowledge Edge and benefits from a Information Edge The report closes with a brief discussion of the preceding analyses and some provisional recommendations regarding future work.

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